














IIMI’s mission is to foster and support sustainable increases in the productivity of irrigated
agriculture within the overall context of the water basin. In serving this mission, IIMI con-
centrates on the integration of policies, technologies and management systems to achieve
workable solutions to real problems—practical, relevant results in the field of irrigation and
water resources.
The publications in this series cover a wide range of subjects—from computer mod-
eling to experience with water users associations—and vary in content from directly ap-
plicable research to more basic studies, on which applied work ultimately depends. Some
research reports are narrowly focused, analytical, and detailed empirical studies; others are
wide-ranging and synthetic overviews of generic problems.
Although most of the reports are published by IIMI staff and their collaborators, we
welcome contributions from others. Each report is reviewed internally by IIMI’s own staff
and Fellows, and by external reviewers. The reports are published and distributed both in
hard copy and electronically (http:// www.cgiar.org/iimi), and where possible all data and
analyses will be available as separate downloadable files. Reports may be copied freely
and cited with due acknowledgment.3 iii
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The economic crisis of Mexico in the 1980s led to radi-
cal and extensive reforms in its agriculture sector.
Among the most significant institutional reforms was
the program to transfer irrigation management re-
sponsibilities for large-scale irrigation districts from
the sole control of the public sector irrigation agency
to a joint management arrangement with newly cre-
ated water user organizations.
This study reports on the findings of a 2-year
field research study started by IIMI late in 1995 in the
112,772-hectare Alto Rio Lerma Irrigation District
(ARLID), Mexico. The study tests the hypothesis that,
in general, irrigation management transfer (IMT) has
positive impacts on operational performance, manage-
rial accountability, O&M budgeting, overall O&M ex-
penditures, cost of water to farmers, and agricultural
and economic productivity.
Each of the aspects evaluated was analyzed for
the period October 1982 to October 1996, comprising
10 years of pre-transfer information and 4 years of
post-transfer information.
The study found that irrigation management
transfer has had very little impact, if any, on surface
water allocation and distribution, and the use of
groundwater. Changes, if any, in agricultural and eco-
nomic productivity and costs to farmers are related to
the wider set of neoliberal agricultural and economic
reforms that started in the 1980s, rather than to the
transfer program per se. On the other hand, there is
strong evidence indicating that transfer resulted in
improvements in system maintenance and O&M cost
recovery.
Although diverse in the ways it has been imple-
mented by agencies and adapted by users, a number
of components characterize the IMT program at
ARLID and elsewhere is Mexico:
• IMT did not come alone, but followed, and was
part of a wider set of neoliberal economic re-
forms.
• IMT was made workable as it met with a politi-
cal commitment at the highest levels.
• IMT was accompanied by the introduction of a
new National Water Law that recognizes water
rights to water user associations (WUAs), as well
as the authority and responsibilities of water us-
ers.
• IMT is a rapid top-down process that has met
with relatively little resistance from farmers.
• New WUAs were given training on system man-
agement.
• WUAs agreed to jointly manage the system with
the agency during a fixed and relatively short pe-
riod of time.
• The Mexican IMT program aims not to maximize
direct user participation in O&M, but to involve
farmers in representative governance.
WUAs in ARLID are still facing a number of
problems that need to be resolved to make irrigation
management by WUAs sustainable. These problems
include: a water law that does not sufficiently recog-
nize water rights to individual users, fee levels that
do not follow inflation, high turnover of staff hired by
the WUAs, lack of continuous training, and difficul-
ties in identifying new roles that the agency could
take on.1
The Government of Mexico responded to
the economic crisis of the 1980s with dras-
tic changes in its agricultural and irrigation
policies. A cornerstone of the latter was a
restructuring and modernization program
of the irrigation sector. One of the strategies
followed in this regard was developing a
government-farmer partnership between the
National Water Commission (CNA), the
government agency responsible for the op-
eration and management (O&M) of the ir-
rigation districts, and the newly established
WUAs. In the first phase of this partner-
ship, CNA remains responsible for manage-
ment of the head works and the main ca-
nals while WUAs take over financial and
managerial responsibilities for operating the
system below the main canals. In the sec-
ond phase of the transfer process, responsi-
bility for operating and maintaining the
main system is handed over to a Limited
Responsibility Society (LRS), which is a fed-
eration of the WUAs at the district level.
CNA is left with the responsibility for man-
aging the reservoirs and river-surface water
pumping plants.
This partnership, which is known as
the Mexican IMT program, was started in
1989 and brought significant changes in the
way the districts are managed. Given the
unsatisfactory level of performance of the
agency-managed districts during the pre-
transfer period (Palacios-Vélez 1994a), this
new approach will be the strategy for the
foreseeable future. Consequently, there is a
felt need expressed by policy makers, irriga-
tion professionals, and water users to evalu-
ate the consequences of this program coun-
trywide.
Mexico is one of the many countries
that has adopted a program that turns over
the management authority for irrigation
systems from government agencies to local
private organizations. The logic, often used
to justify irrigation management transfer
policies, is described by Vermillion (1997)
and summarized below:
1. Direct control by farmers provides
them with the incentives to improve
operational performance.
2. IMT improves the quality and cost-effi-
ciency of irrigation management and
enhances the profitability of irrigated
agriculture.
3. Management transfer will save money
that can be used elsewhere by the gov-
ernment.
The following hypotheses follow the
above argument and are tested in this re-
port:
1. Farmers’ increased involvement in con-
trol over irrigation planning and opera-
tions will lead to managerial changes
which aim at a more reliable and timely
delivery of irrigation services and better
adequacy of the service.
2. Shorter administrative distances be-
tween water users and system manag-
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ers, introduced by IMT, improve mana-
gerial accountability and communica-
tion between farmers and system man-
agers, and will lead to greater respon-
siveness of field staff to farmers.
3. Farmers’ direct control over O&M bud-
gets will lead to a better match between
available resources to do O&M and
perceived needs by farmers.
4. IMT will result in a reduction in expen-
diture by governments for O&M, in an
Economic and Legal Contexts
The Mexican IMT program should be
viewed in the context of other constitu-
tional, political, economic, and institutional
reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s.
One of the major reforms that affected
farmer production in the irrigation systems
was the revision of Article 27 of the Consti-
tution in 1992, which effectively brought an
end to the land reform program resulting
from the Mexican revolution in the early
part of the century (Ibarra-Mendívil 1996).
This revision created the legal foundation
for the privatization of the ejidos (land re-
form communities) in all irrigation districts.
In addition, the policy of guaranteed crop
prices and subsidized credit was substituted
for market policies and compensatory ser-
vices (De Vries 1995; Foley 1995; Nelson
1997; Presler 1997). As a consequence, farm-
ers’ access to public agricultural support
services became more difficult or simply
ceased to exist. Dismantling the public sec-
tor, including the public irrigation sector,
would not have been possible without the
commitment at the highest political levels to
reduce staff working in the public sector.
increase in financial self-sufficiency, and
in greater financial transparency.
5. IMT will increase the cost of irrigation
services to farmers.
6. Where IMT is one in a larger set of eco-
nomic and agricultural reforms, it will
be difficult to attribute changes in crop
diversification, cropping intensities,
yields, and agricultural productivity to
IMT.
The Mexican Irrigation Management Transfer Program
While underemphasizing the diversity in
the ways the program has been imple-
mented and adopted, international organi-
zations have advocated the Mexican IMT
program as “the transfer model” to other
countries, apparently due to the program’s
scale and speed of implementation. By De-
cember 1996, almost 2.92 million hectares
had been transferred to 372 WUAs, repre-
senting 90 percent of the area served by the
80 irrigation districts in the country (CNA
1996).
The main objective of the Mexican IMT
program was to reduce public expenditure
on irrigation O&M while promoting greater
user participation in the management of ir-
rigation districts. The program also pro-
vided assistance, such as on-farm develop-
ment initiatives to enhance farm-level pro-
ductivity and water conservation. A further
objective was to restore economic growth
by using a system of pricing water, based
on international prices, marginal costs, or
scarcity value (Gorriz, Subramanian, and
Simas 1996).3
At the same time, the IMT program
and other water problems created the neces-
sity to revise the water law (Palacios-Vélez
1994b; Rosegrant and Schleyer 1996). In
1992, a new National Water Act was pro-
mulgated, which allows the CNA and pri-
vate parties such as WUAs to:
1. Sign a tradable water concession agree-
ment, which gives WUAs the right to
buy and sell water either within the ag-
riculture sector or with other sectors in
the economy.
2. Sign a permit for utilization of the dis-
tricts’ infrastructure, which allows pri-
vate entities to make use of govern-
ment property.
The Strategy
IMT has been a top-down process moti-
vated by international development banks
and implemented by the Government of
Mexico. Six components of the strategy
characterize the IMT program and largely
explain the high speed of the process and
the relatively low resistance by farmers to
assume O&M responsibilities.
1. The program was developed on an al-
ready existing strong organizational
base: the ejidos and the organizations of
private growers. Government officials
visited the ejidos to inform farmers
about the transfer program and told
them to select their delegates to the
WUAs that were to be newly estab-
lished. In addition to the ejido del-
egates, private growers—who normally
are organized through their coopera-
tives and growers’ unions (Foley
1995)—were also asked to select their
delegates to the WUAs. Subsequently,
these delegates were asked to elect
from among themselves the president,
treasurer, and secretary to each of their
WUAs. To most farmers the concept of
transfer was completely new and many
delegates were hardly aware of what
their new role comprised (Whiteford
and Bernal 1996).
2. IMT followed a wide set of other neo
liberal reforms that had already priva-
tized the provision of many agricultural
services. Farmers had also become
aware that O&M services traditionally
provided by CNA would soon cease to
exist. Moreover, the quality of service
provided before transfer had declined
and CNA tried to convince farmers that
WUAs could provide better service at
lower costs. CNA was the first to trans-
fer the larger irrigation districts in the
north of Mexico, where they knew
many large private producers would
support this idea, to show that IMT
was workable.
3. CNA agreed to work in a collaborative
mode for at least 6 months from the
time of transfer so that the new WUAs
could gain experience before they were
left on their own.
4. Unlike in Sri Lanka and Nepal, for in-
stance, the Mexican IMT program does
not aim to maximize direct participation
in O&M of all users but aims to involve
farmers in representative governance.
5. CNA granted concessions to the WUAs
to use its machinery and equipment to
maintain the canals, which meant that
(at least initially) WUAs were not con-
fronted with high capital costs.
6. The government, and later private or-
ganizations also, provided extensive
training on O&M and financial man-
agement to leaders and technical staff
of the WUAs (Johnson 1996).4
Changes in Roles
As part of the transfer process, hydraulic
committees at the district level were intro-
duced to help plan annual and seasonal
water allocations. Until transfer, CNA was
wholly responsible for these allocations. Af-
ter transfer these committees comprised
CNA representatives, the state government,
and each WUA in the district.
Prior to transfer, CNA employed heads
of irrigation units
1 and ditch tenders who
were responsible for daily O&M at all sys-
tem levels down to the farm inlets. Farmers
had to go to the CNA unit offices to pay
their fees and were given water by the
CNA ditch tender. After transfer, these units
were converted into the modules, which
were managed by the new individual
WUAs. Out of the fees, which they directly
collect from the users, the WUAs now em-
ploy their own module managers, ditch ten-
ders, maintenance personnel, and adminis-
trative staff. Based on the volume of water
a module buys from CNA and on the pro-
portional amount of main infrastructure that
serves a module, the modules have to pay a
The Irrigation District
Figure 1 shows the general layout of the
Alto Rio Lerma Irrigation District (ARLID).
This district has a gross area of 112,772 hect-
ares and is located in the State of
Guanajuato, Mexico. There are roughly
24,000 water users in the irrigation district,
55 percent of whom are ejidatarios (members
of the ejidos) of the 281 ejidos within the
district and 45 percent are classified as
“small private growers.”
2 The average land-
percentage of their total fee collection to
CNA.
Although officially CNA’s role below
the main canals has ceased to exist, obser-
vations and press reports show that CNA
continues to play an informal (but impor-
tant) role in setting the O&M fee and
planned seasonal water allocation within
the modules, as well as conflict resolution
within the WUAs. Yet, the traditional CNA-
users relationships are weakened. These are
being replaced by new networks of leaders
of WUAs, users, private international seed
and agrochemical companies, and local and
state politicians. These actors play a role in
setting the market prices for agricultural in-
puts, electricity, and crop produce. It has
become clear that many WUAs want to in-
crease their role in these networks (Kloezen
and Garcés-Restrepo n.d.[a]). This has
stimulated discussions within the WUAs on
whether or not associations should expand
their O&M mandate toward the provision
of wider agricultural support services,
which were earlier provided by the public
sector but are now provided by the private
sector.
Research Setting
holding in the irrigation district is 5 hect-
ares, with 3.7 hectares, and 7.6 hectares, re-
spectively, being the averages for the
ejidatarios and the private growers.
The climate is moderately subhumid
with an average yearly precipitation of 730
mm and an average temperature of 19 
oC.
Yearly evapotranspiration is approximately
1,900 mm and relative humidity is about 60
percent. The dry winter season, which re-
ceives approximately 80 mm of rainfall,




which were more or less
independent hydraulic
blocks, with sizes rang-




In some cases, units
were split in two or
more modules.
2The concept “small pri-
vate grower” (pequeño
propietario) is a misno-
mer because in Mexico
such user category al-
lows ownership up to
100 hectares for an indi-
vidual owner.5
summer season lasts from May until No-
vember and has an average of 670 mm of
rainfall. Basic climatic data for the district
are presented in figure 2.
Surface water for the district is pro-
vided by four dams with a combined stor-
age capacity of 2,140 million cubic meters
serving 77,697 hectares. The storage dams
are complemented by five diversion dams
located along the Lerma River. The irriga-
tion network comprises 475 km of main ca-
nals and 1,658 km of secondary and tertiary
canals. Likewise, there is a network of ap-
proximately 1,031 km of drainage canals.
In addition to the surface water, there
are altogether 1,714 deep wells serving an
additional 35,075 hectares within the dis-
trict; thus the district relies on both surface
water and groundwater, with their com-
bined use playing a vital role in system op-
eration. The State of Guanajuato is under-
laid by 18 different aquifers, 3 of which are
partly exploited by farmers within the
ARLID. The estimated total annual recharge
of these 3 aquifers is 500 million cubic
meters.
The main crops grown during the dry
winter season are wheat and barley. During
the wetter summer season the main crops
are sorghum, maize, and bean. Vegetables
are grown by both ejidatarios and private
growers, with the latter also producing for
the export market. Farmers who use a deep
well tend to grow more vegetables than
those farmers who depend totally on canal
water.
Presently, the irrigation district is di-
vided into 11 modules ranging in size from
1,513 to 18,694 hectares, and each is man-
aged by an individual WUA. Table 1 shows
the high diversity in the social (number of
private growers v. ejidatarios) and physical
FIGURE 1.
The Alto Rio Lerma Irrigation District and its 11 modules.6
(infrastructure and irrigation source) charac-
teristics of these modules. The diversity
shows the different settings, within one
single district, in which the Mexican IMT
has been introduced. The post-transfer orga-
nizational setup of the district is presented
in figure 3.
3 The figure shows that CNA
and WUAs are equal parties that share re-
sponsibilities for system O&M.
After transfer, by law, at the start of
each agricultural year in November the hy-
draulic committee decides how much area
can be safely irrigated in the district and by
each module. The area to be irrigated is
normally a function of the combined water
storage in the four dams. Based on this vol-
ume, the hydraulic committee also decides
on the number of times irrigation services
can be delivered to the users and whether
these are for both winter and summer sea-
sons or only for the winter season. Gener-
ally, irrigation services are provided three to
five times in the winter season while they
are provided only once in the summer sea-
son. Subsequently, the water available is
distributed in strict proportionality to each
module’s surface irrigation entitlement area.
Taking into consideration that the modules
can restrict the area to be irrigated by the
users, farmers can then request water at
anytime during each irrigation period,
keeping in mind the number of times of ir-
rigation services to which they are entitled
over the cropping season. Fees are normally
paid to the WUA prior to each individual
irrigation. Farmers receive a receipt of pay-
ment which they have to show to the ditch
tender before water is allocated to their
fields.
FIGURE 2.
Climatic data for the Alto Rio Lerma Irrigation District.



































































































































































































































































3This chart does not include the recently created Limited Re-
sponsibility Society (LRS). Its role is not described in this re-
port as during the period of this research it had not yet become
functional.7
TABLE 1.
Salient features of the 11 modules in the Alto Rio Lerma Irrigation District.
Area (ha) Number Number of users Area by irrigation source Irrigation network Drainage network
of ejidos (ha) (km) (km)
Ejido Private Total Ejido Private Total Surface Public Private Total Main Secondary Total Main Secondary Total
Module sector growers sector growers wells wells canals canals drains drains
Acambaro 6,545 2,304 8,849 23 1,622 308 1,930 6,727 257 1,724 8,708 43 101 144 28 96 123
Salvatierra 13,561 2,336 15,897 44 5,082 972 6,054 12,775 565 2,753 16,093 116 120 236 42 176 218
Jaral 3,236 3,453 6,689 16 1,062 401 1,463 4,381 371 1,992 6,744 60 73 134 12 80 92
Valle 7,359 6,319 13,678 31 1,773 536 2,309 7,990 778 3,955 12,723 31 162 193 52 83 135
Cortazar 9,781 8,668 18,448 35 2,169 993 3,162 10,934 1,964 5,796 18,694 75 238 312 23 85 108
Salamanca 5,165 8,992 14,157 37 1,178 1,534 2,712 12,109 573 3,426 16,108 61 174 235 10 91 101
Irapuato 4,078 4,312 8,391 19 984 285 1,269 4,810 688 3,090 8,588 18 102 120 18 43 61
Abasolo 5,229 11,136 16,365 38 1,164 1,259 2,423 10,911 1,152 3,390 15,453 28 141 169 33 39 72
Huanimaro 2,261 1,470 3,731 18 611 229 840 2,802 430 491 3,723 20 20 40 15 41 56
Corralejo 1,219 297 1,516 5 264 11 275 653 643 217 1,513 12 0 12 0 1 1
La Purisima 3,437 982 4,419 15 936 118 1,054 3,605 0 820 4,425 11 52 63 27 27 54
Total 61,871 50,269 112,140 281 16,845 6,646 23,491 77,697 7,421 27,654 112,772 475 1,183 1,658 260 761 1,0218
FIGURE 3.
The organizational structure of the Alto Rio Lerma Irrigation District after transfer.9
Data Collection Methodology
IIMI started this study in October 1995 with
the establishment of project offices in
Cortazar and Salvatierra modules. The
study combines data from a number of dif-
ferent sources, at different system levels.
Time series data for the cropping seasons
1982-96 stem from records kept by CNA at
irrigation district, regional, and central lev-
els, as well as from the 11 WUAs at the
module level. These data included cropping
patterns, crop yields, farm gate prices, cli-
mate data from seven selected stations
within and near the district, monthly and
seasonal canal flows at different system lev-
els, dam storage and releases, cost and vol-
umes of maintenance work done, irrigation
fees collected and planned, and actual
O&M budgets. Where possible, daily or
weekly records were used and aggregated
by IIMI, rather than using seasonal or an-
nual summary reports published by the
agency and the modules.
CNA as well as most WUAs use com-
puters to enter, monitor, and process their
data. IIMI always had full and uncondi-
tional access to these as well as other files,
which provided excellent transparency of
the data used for this study. Several tools
were applied to check the quality of the
data. Aggregation of module level data pro-
vided a cross-check for data collected at the
district level. Secondary data were further
cross-checked by data collected from other
sources like rural development banks. Al-
though not presented in this paper, primary
hydrologic data collected for an ongoing
performance assessment study (Kloezen
and Garcés-Restrepo n.d.[b]) provided a
tool to cross-check the quality of officially
reported canal flows at different hydrologic
control points in the system during a period
of four irrigation seasons.
The FAO’s CROPWAT and its comple-
ment CLIMWAT software packages were
used to calculate crop water requirements.
Outputs per unit of land and water were
calculated following the standardized pro-
cedure described in Molden, Sakthivadivel,
and Perry (forthcoming). This procedure
converts cropping patterns that comprise
multiple crops into ‘equivalent´ yields and
the Standardized Gross Value of Produc-
tion. The equivalent crops used in this
study are wheat for the winter season and
sorghum for the summer season.
Open and informal interviews with key
informants such as CNA and state officials,
module personnel, and farmers were used
to better interpret secondary data, as well as
to better understand the process and impact
of IMT at ARLID. Attendance at CNA,
module, hydraulic committee meetings,
workshops during the period of study, and
a literature review complemented the data
collection.
Users’ perceptions of the impact of the
IMT program were captured by both semi-
structured open-ended interviews and a
farm survey. For the farmer survey the sys-
tem was divided into four zones which ag-
gregated modules with similar physical,
hydraulic, agronomic, and socioeconomic
conditions. Altogether 125 randomly se-
lected farmers within the 4 zones were in-
terviewed through a carefully designed and
pre-tested questionnaire. The survey fol-
lowed the classical head to tail distribution
and accounted for land tenure arrange-
ments (ejidatarios v. private growers) and
water source (canal v. well).
To enable comparisons across countries
and time, IIMI converts local units and cur-
rencies to international standard units and
constant US dollar prices. Especially the lat-
ter proved to be a difficult task for the
evaluation of the Mexican IMT program. By10
December 1994 Mexico faced an economic
crisis, which was followed by a devaluation
of the peso against the dollar (from 3.5 pe-
sos per dollar in July 1994 to 7.8 pesos per
dollar in July 1996), as well as an inflation
rate of approximately 50 percent in 1995.
The start of the crisis fell exactly in the
middle of the four post-transfer years re-
ported here. In this report, as far as pos-
sible, all prices are converted into constant
July 1994 dollars. Nominal peso prices are
given in addition, but only if these clarify
the impact analysis.
IMT Process at ARLID
The IMT process at ARLID started in 1992,
with CNA officials paying visits to all the
281 ejidos in the district. During the second
half of 1992, each of these ejidos had to se-
lect its delegates to the general assemblies
of the modules. Subsequently, these del-
egates elected their boards. Irrigation fee
levels were established for each module,
using a methodology designed by CNA
based on the volume that each module is
buying. The percentage of total fee collec-
tion to be paid to CNA was negotiated. By
November 1992, all 11 modules officially
assumed responsibilities for fee collection
and O&M of the infrastructure below the
main canals. From June 1992 to December
1994, CNA provided 18 training courses
where 331 persons participated. These
courses were mainly directed to the techni-
cal staff of the new WUAs and focused on
the concept of IMT, system O&M, and sea-
sonal planning (Kloezen 1997). By Novem-
ber 1992, the new WUAs started hiring
their own staff, but until mid-1993 CNA
helped the WUAs to manage the distribu-
tary canals and those below them.
In 1992, concessions permitting WUAs
to use the infrastructure were signed be-
tween the WUAs and CNA. By law, these
usufructuary rights should be accompanied
by volumetric water concessions. In the case
of ARLID, these volumetric concessions are
based on the average water available in the
4 reservoirs at the start of the agricultural
year for the period 1949-94, the total aver-
age volume of which is 832 million cubic
meters. Each module is entitled to a propor-
tional share of this volume, provided that
the volume is available at the start of the
season. By law, these volumes should be
registered in the Public Registration of Wa-
ter Rights (REPDA) at CNA. However, by
April 1997, although signed by CNA, these
volumetric concessions had not been passed
on to the Register.
One of the major differences between
the previous and the new National Water
Act is that under the latter water can be
sold, such as from one WUA to another.
These sales need the approval of CNA, as
well as of the majority of the general assem-
bly of the WUAs involved. In 1995 and
1996, five cases in ARLID were observed
where WUAs bought water from other
WUAs. The prices paid were negotiated by
the WUAs and differed considerably, from
US$0.40 per 1,000 m
3 to $0.90 per 1,000 m
3,
depending on the distances over which the
water had to be transported (Kloezen and
Garcés-Restrepo n.d.[b]).
In the case of ARLID, the hydraulic
committee has become an effective planning
body. Generally, the committee meets three
or four times at the start of the season, and
again at the end of the season when water
becomes more scarce. Although CNA con-
tinues to play a major role in assessing the
available volume, observations show that in
many cases participation of module repre-
sentatives has led to decisions on area to be
cropped and number of times irrigation ser-
vices are to be provided that deviated from
CNA’s initial advice. The hydraulic commit-11
tee has also been a strong platform for the
modules to negotiate with CNA to establish
the LRS and to determine the percentage of
total fee collection to be paid to CNA once
the LRS starts functioning. Finally, it has
been observed that the modules have also
used the hydraulic committee to get better
access to State and Federal programs that
help the modules to improve water man-
agement.
A direct consequence of the transfer is
the change in staffing, as all the staff re-
sponsible for managing canals—the dis-
tributary canals and those below—are now
directly hired by the WUAs while staff re-
sponsible for main system management
continue to be hired by CNA. In general,
the managers of the modules are respon-
sible for daily O&M, although they receive
guidelines from the board of delegates. In
ARLID, WUAs were very reluctant to hire
ditch tenders and other technical staff who
had been made redundant by CNA as a re-
sult of IMT. The respondents mention four
reasons that explain this:
1. They wanted to reduce their number to
become more cost-effective.
2. Under CNA, the agency had difficulties
in controlling ditch tenders, often re-
sulting in bad performance, lack of ac-
countability, and rent-seeking behavior.
3. Modules wanted to hire their ‘own
people,’ which in some cases led to hir-
ing relatively young ditch tenders, who
were well-trained but who lacked expe-
rience.
4. To eliminate union involvement in the
management of the modules.
Table 2 shows that CNA staff levels
were reduced from 273 in 1992 to 116 in
1996, a reduction of almost 60 percent,
which means a considerable saving for the
government. On the other hand, the re-
maining 116 CNA staff are responsible for
the dams and the 2 main canals only. This
relatively large number explains why total
staff numbers (CNA plus modules) have in-
creased by 13 percent after transfer. Espe-
cially the modules feel that an unspecified
percentage of these CNA staff are residual
personnel that for political and labor-union-
related reasons remain within the agency
with no specific task. This has been one of
the major reasons why the modules wanted
to create the Limited Responsibility Society
(LRS) which will take over management of
the main system. They feel that this will be
much more cost-effective than the current
arrangement. In February 1997, the LRS was
established. Consequently, soon CNA’s role
will be further reduced. It is believed that
by the end of 1997 CNA´s staff in the dis-
trict will be reduced to 30 persons or less,
down from 273 staff in 1992, and 116 staff in
1996.
Before transfer, users were mainly
organized through the ejido, production
cooperatives, and farmer unions (Foley
1995). The new WUAs cut across these
traditional organizational lines. As the
TABLE 2.
Staff levels before and after transfer, the Alto Rio Lerma Irrigation
District.
Before (8/92) After (8/96)
CNA CNA Modules Total
Governance 4 3 11 14
Operation 155 70 94 164
Maintenance 81 19 46 65
Administration 30 15 41 56
Monitoring and evaluation 3 2 0 2
Other 0 7 0 7
Total 273 116 192 308
Canal irrigation area (ha) 85,118 85,118
Area (ha) per staff member 312 27612
examples of the establishment of the LRS
and the negotiation of the percentage of
total fee collection to be paid to CNA show,
WUAs have become powerful actors in the
political and economic arenas. Some mod-
ules in ARLID are very market-oriented and
aim to commercialize agriculture to a higher
level. Presidents of these modules are
generally influential private growers who
use and expand their networks with private
companies and politicians to obtain better
prices and services. In other modules,
decision making on staff policies and
resource allocation is determined more by
party and ejido politics.
Evidence from other countries indicates
that users are not always aware of the
change in management in their systems
(Vermillion and Garcés-Restrepo 1996). The
farmer survey done at ARLID, however,
shows that 94 percent of the users know ir-
rigation management has been transferred
from the government to the WUAs; 63 per-
cent of the respondents indicate they know
the names of the presidents of the WUAs;
and 80 percent know who their delegate is.
On the other hand, only 33 percent of the
farmers surveyed are familiar with the pro-
cess of electing the president; and 57 per-
cent of the farmers know how their own
delegates to the assembly were chosen.
Impact on Water Allocation and Distribution
IMT has not resulted in major changes to
the way seasonal planning is done. At the
district level, the hydraulic committee
adopted the same planning method used by
CNA (as described above). Also, modules
continue to follow the methodologies estab-
lished by CNA before transfer.
Figure 4 shows the relationship be-
tween cropping intensity and dam storage
at ARLID for the period 1982–1996. This re-
lationship highlights how annual storage
management has changed as a result of
transfer. The area values refer to the total
area irrigated for the two seasons during a
particular year. The graph indicates that if
dam storage at the beginning of the season
exceeds 1,100 million cubic meters, the
cropping intensity response curve is rather
flat, with an average cropping intensity of
137 percent although for different reasons,
this flat response has not changed after
IMT. Before IMT, CNA tried to keep water
in storage (at the cost of increasing the irri-
gated area) to avoid running out of water at
the end of the season and lose their ac-
countability with the users. After IMT (and
especially in the previous 2 years) water
users exerted much pressure on the WUAs
and consequently on the hydraulic commit-
tee and CNA to increase the number of
FIGURE 4.

































had a relatively higher storage, cropping
intensities have not increased.
Figure 5 indicates that no impact in the
total area irrigated can be attributed to the
IMT program. As explained above, this is
more dependent on annual rainfall and
dam management policies than on manage-
rial changes invoked by the transfer. While
the graph shows an increasing trend in area
irrigated after transfer, given the area fluc-
tuations in previous years, and the very low
values of the winter seasons of 1982/1983,
1987/1988, and 1989/1990, no further con-
clusions can be drawn as yet.
With respect to water distribution be-
tween the modules, figure 6 provides the
average differences between actual volumes
supplied and assigned to the modules for
the periods before transfer (1982 to 1991)
and after transfer (1992 to 1996).
4 The figure
shows that the differences between planned
and actual volumes have been slightly re-
duced after transfer, most notably in the
FIGURE 5.
Total irrigated area per season and annual rainfall, the Alto Rio Lerma
Irrigation District, agricultural years 1982–1996.
FIGURE 6.
Average difference between actual supply and assigned volumes, before (1982–1991) and after
(1992–1996) IMT.
times irrigation services are provided for
the winter season to guarantee a good
wheat crop at the cost of growing sorghum
or maize with irrigation services provided
only once during the summer season. As a
consequence, although recent years have
4La Purisima module
has been excluded from
this graph as it has its
own dam which it does
not share with other
modules. Abasolo and
Corralejo were taken to-
gether as they share the
same canal control point
where measurements
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Jaral module. Six of the nine cases show the
difference has decreased, while three cases
show the difference has increased. Before
IMT, 2 modules stayed within the 5 percent
difference range, while after transfer the
number increased to 3 modules. Whereas
prior to transfer 2 modules exceeded the 20
percent difference, none of the modules ex-
ceed this range after IMT. This moderate
improvement reflects an effort by the hy-
draulic committee to be more equitable in
the allocation of water, a concern that is fu-
eled by the participation of all modules in
controlling water allocation at the district
level. Each module insists on receiving the
volume it has been assigned and has paid
for. The sum of the absolute value of the
differences before and after transfer is -10
percent and -12 percent, respectively, which
shows that in both cases modules get nor-
mally slightly less water than they have
been assigned to.
To assess the impact of the irrigation
management transfer program on the use of
canal water, the variable Relative Water
Supply
5 (RWS) was used. Actual values for
RWS were obtained from flow and rainfall
data and cropping patterns at the module
level and were compared with planned and
reported values. The latter values for canal
water were aggregated at system level from
both module-level and ditch tenders’ field-
level reports. The results are presented in
figure 7. The average of the RWS values is
2.7 for the pre-IMT as well as the post-IMT
period. This suggests that there is no dis-
cernible differences between pre- and post-
transfer. However, the graph shows a clear
downward trend after 1993, with 1996 hav-
ing the lowest value (2.4) of the recorded
period. This reflects the increasing effort by
several modules to come as close as pos-
sible to their irrigation plans. For the most
recent 2 years there is a greater match be-
tween the planned and reported values at
the field level. Detailed comparison of ac-
tual flows measured by IIMI with ditch ten-
ders’ flow reports affirms the observation of
some module leaders and CNA staff that
inexperienced ditch tenders have difficulties
assessing the volumes they supply to the
farmers. They tend to report values which
are close to the planned target rather than
actual values (Kloezen, Garcés-Restrepo,
and Marmolejo 1996; Kloezen and Garcés-
Restrepo n.d.[b]). As irrigation services are
provided only once during the summer sea-
son, RWS values are generally lower than
during the winter season. The average RWS
summer value shows a moderate reduction
after IMT. For the pre-IMT period the value
was 2.1, while the average post-IMT sum-
mer value was 1.9.
The modules advise about, but do not
have control over, cropping patterns. As the
planned irrigation depths are calculated on
the basis of water requirements of the major
crop (resulting in rather flat planed-RWS
curves, see figure 9A), any deviation in cul-
tivation from the main crop will result in
further mismatch between the actual water
FIGURE 7.
Planned, reported, and actual RWS values, the Alto Rio Lerma Irri-
gation District, winter crop 1983–1996.
5Here Relative Water
Supply or RWS is de-
fined as the ratio of to-
tal water supply (irriga-
tion + total rainfall) to
crop demand at field
level. Because there are
no historical data, crop
demand only includes
consumptive use and
does not consider non-
beneficial ET, losses to
drains, and net flow to




demand and the amount supplied. This sys-
tem of seasonal irrigation scheduling has
significant implications for modules whose
cropping pattern deviates from the main
crop, as is the case in the Salvatierra mod-
ule. Since 1992, the area grown under bean
has become more and more important at
the cost of the main crop, wheat (figure 8).
Even so, the WUA continues to do its irri-
gation scheduling as if the entire area were
under wheat. Since bean and vegetables re-
quire less water than wheat, the RWS val-
ues increased dramatically (figure 9A),
without the module addressing adequately
to this situation. Note that the module has
attempted to correct this situation in the last
2 years.
Figure 9B shows a different pattern for
the case of the Cortazar module: a down-
ward trend since the transfer of manage-
ment, something which can be explained by
the continuous efforts of the leadership in
Cortazar to verify the volumes supplied,
improve the performance of ditch tenders
by training them and firing those that per-
form poorly, and make physical improve-
ments to the canal and drainage networks.
These two examples show the different re-
actions of the two modules to IMT within
the same district.
Pre-transfer data on water distribution
between farmers within modules do not ex-
ist, hence a “before-after” comparison can-
not be made. A detailed study of water dis-
tribution under post-transfer conditions
shows that in the sampled study area there
is no clear bias towards head- or tail-end
farmers and that all farmers receive suffi-
cient water to meet crop requirements
(Kloezen and Garcés-Restrepo n.d.[a]).
Results from the farmer survey on
farmers’ perceptions on changes in system
operation are summarized in table 3. Thirty-
six percent of the farmers perceive that wa-
ter adequacy at the field level has improved
FIGURE 8.
The change in cropping pattern in the Salvatierra module, winter crop
1985–1996.
FIGURE 9A.





















as a result of transfer while 23 percent re-
port that it has become worse. The answers
related to timeliness of water distribution
and farmers´ access to the ditch tender
show similar results. Thirty percent of the
farmers feel that distribution among farmers
has improved while 22 percent perceive
that distribution was better before transfer.
For all these services approximately 60 per-
cent of the farmers are satisfied with the
current situation. The only service that
shows considerable improvement is the ser-
vice provided by the ditch tender: the way
he attends to farmers´ requests, the way he
solves problems, and the decrease in brib-
ery. Most farmers report that, in particular,
the attitude of ditch tenders towards users
has improved. The survey also shows that
83 percent of the farmers believe that the
WUAs should be responsible for operation
of the main and secondary systems while
CNA should continue to be responsible for
dam operations.
In summary, analyses of dam manage-
ment, water allocation between modules,
and water use by the modules indicate that
there has been very little impact on water
management and use as a result of irriga-
tion management transfer in ARLID. This is
because the water allocation and irrigation
scheduling practices have not changed since
the WUAs took over these tasks from CNA.
On the other hand, observations of meet-
ings and discussions with WUAs and the
LRS suggest that WUAs are getting more
and more concerned about the relatively
high water usage; something which has be-
come very apparent since some modules
had to start buying water from other mod-
ules and even from private well owners.
After taking office, the new president of the
recently established LRS publicly stated that
looking for better ways to use and conserve
water would be one of the major priorities
of the federation.
FIGURE 9B.
Planned, reported, and actual RWS, the Cortazar module, winter crop
1985–1996.
TABLE 3.
Farmers’ perceptions of the change in system operation as a result of IMT (%), n=125.
Water Timeliness Water Access to Service
adequacy at of water distribution ditch provided by
field level delivery among farmers tender ditch tender
Poor before and after IMT 2 2 8 4 2
Poor before, good after IMT 36 30 34 31 40
Good before and after IMT 26 34 31 32 32
Good before, poor after IMT 23 22 15 20 14
Other* 13 12 12 13 12
Total 100 100 100 100 100
* “Other” includes ‘don’t know,’ ‘no response,’ and ‘not applicable because respondent only uses a private well.’17
The State of Guanajuato has a high concen-
tration of deep wells. Approximately 20 per-
cent of all the wells in Mexico are found in
Guanajuato. Groundwater is available
through 18 different aquifers, 3 of which are
relevant to ARLID: Valle de Acambaro,
Zona Presa Solis, and Irapuato-Valle
Santiago. The total area underlaid by these
three aquifers is 277,200 hectares, which in-
cludes the district under study, with an an-
nual recharge of 500 million cubic meters.
Groundwater table fluctuations in the state
are monitored by CNA and point towards
an annual overexploitation of the aquifers
of 829 million cubic meters, with 117 million
cubic meters corresponding to the ARLID-
related aquifers (Muñoz 1996). These values
correspond to overexploitation of the aqui-
fer at the rate of 40 percent and 20 percent
for the state and the district, respectively
(Kloezen and Garcés-Restrepo n.d.[b]).
Generally, modules exclude irrigation
areas that have access to wells from canal
water service, although there is no provi-
sion in the Water Act to that effect. How-
ever in practice, many well users make use
of the canal network to transport the water
they pump to their fields. This practice has
increased after transfer. Prior to transfer the
CNA-operated “public wells” were only
used to supplement surface water in times
of water stress. CNA transferred these pub-
lic wells to the WUAs that subsequently as-
signed areas to each of these wells. Users
within these areas are supposed to use
pumped water only. However, for almost
all these areas, water users have to make
use of the canal network to transport their
water. On the other hand, farmers report
that unauthorized use of canal water by
owners of private wells has decreased since
transfer as the modules have more control
over the ditch tenders who sometimes al-
low these practices in turn for some finan-
cial gratuities from well owners.
Figure 10 illustrates seasonal and total
volume pumped by private wells within
ARLID for the period 1982 to 1996. The vol-
umes pumped in the dry winter season are
higher than in the summer season. The in-
crease in volume pumped since 1983 can be
explained by two factors: the relatively dry
years of the early 1980s and, in 1982–1983
the initiation of a program to grant conces-
sions to new wells. The reduction in vol-
ume pumped that followed this period can
be explained by the dramatic fall of the
static water table, which by 1996 was 2 to 5
meters per year. Although new concessions
are not granted anymore, a program to up-
grade existing pumps and wells started in
1995.
Figure 10 also shows information on
the estimated annual recharge for the entire
three aquifers that serve the district as well
as the estimated annual recharge for those
parts of these aquifers that underly
ARLID,
6 being 500 and 205 million cubic
Impact on Groundwater Use
FIGURE 10.
Seasonal and total volumes pumped by private wells in relation to















































Volume pumped in winter season
Volume pumped in summer season
Estimated annual recharge accrued to the district: 205 million m
Estimated annual recharge of the entire aquifer: 500 million  m
3
3
6The two levels indi-
cated in the graph are
based on recent data col-
lected by CNA. Al-
though annual recharge
will vary as a conse-
quence of changes in an-
nual rainfall patterns,
reliable historical data
on this variation are not
available.18
meters, respectively. Comparison between
these recharge levels with the total volumes
pumped points to overexploitation of the
aquifer. The graph shows that the with-
drawal during the winter season almost ex-
ceeds the annual recharge to the district,
meaning that for the remainder of the year
the district mines groundwater at the cost
of aquifer users outside the district area.
This leads to high competition with domes-
tic and industrial users in urban areas near
the district.
Contrary to popular belief about
ARLID, cropping patterns of areas irrigated
by wells have not changed as a result of
transfer or other agricultural reforms (figure
11). Figure 12 shows that there has been
hardly any change in RWS values for the
winter season. This continues to be around
2.25, which again indicates the alarming
high level of excessive groundwater use.
7
Fluctuations in values for both the first and
second summer crops are explained by the
fact that well users generally try to avoid
the risk of late onset of rainfall and start
pumping as soon as possible. This leads to
high RWS values in years with normal to
high rainfall.
The lack of impact on groundwater use
as a result of transfer is something that
could have been expected. The transfer pro-
gram primarily affects the administration of
facilities and resources related to the use of
FIGURE 11.
The change in cropping pattern of private wells in the Alto Rio Lerma Irrigation District, winter crop
1982–1996.
FIGURE 12.
Seasonal actual RWS values for private wells, the Alto Rio Lerma
Irrigation District, agricultural years 1983–1996.
7There are no data on























As a result of transfer, modules also had to
take over responsibility to maintain the sec-
ondary canals and drains and associated in-
frastructure. The general belief among farm-
ers was that transfer of these responsibilities
should have been accompanied by an inten-
sive system rehabilitation and moderniza-
tion program. However, this was not done
in ARLID.
One of the preconditions for transfer
was that CNA should grant concessions to
the WUAs to use almost all of its heavy
machinery, such as draglines and hydraulic
excavators. In total, 25 pieces of equipment
(including some relatively new pieces), with
a total estimated cost of 1.7 million US dol-
lars, have been transferred to the modules.
However, some of this machinery was in
severe disrepair and modules felt that main-
tenance of this machinery would cost them
more than buying new equipment. As a
consequence, during the period December
1992 to July 1995, the modules bought 29
pieces of heavy machinery. These were paid
for out of fees collected from the users. In
addition, three modules received new
equipment, such as land leveling equip-
ment, as part of a World Bank assisted pro-
gram for on-farm water management im-
provement (PRODEP).
In the 3 years preceding transfer (1989-
1991), 48 percent of O&M expenditures by
CNA went to maintenance of the dams, and
main and secondary canal infrastructures.
The average maintenance expenditure per
hectare was US$24/ha (July 1994 dollars).
After transfer, maintenance costs have been
shared between CNA and the modules.
CNA pays for maintenance of the dams, the
five main diversion structures, and main
canals and drains. The modules pay for
maintenance of all secondary canals, irriga-
tion canals, and drains. After transfer, 63
percent of the total O&M expenditures went
to maintenance, which was an increase by
15 percent compared to pre-transfer years.
After transfer, 82 percent of the total main-
tenance budget has been spent within the
modules, while 18 percent has been spent
for maintenance of the dams and the main
system. Also in the 3 years after transfer,
the average cost of maintenance was
US$24/ha (July 1994 dollars). This suggests
that the level of maintenance investment
has remained the same.
8
One problem with the above compari-
son of expenditures before and after trans-
fer is that it conceals an important impact:
the higher quality of maintenance services
provided following transfer (Svendsen
1996). The constant US$24/ha expenditure
level could mean that no real improvements
have occurred; it could also mean that the
modules use their staff and machinery more
efficiently. The total number of staff respon-
sible for maintenance decreased from 81 be-
surface water. Yet, the question remains
whether the WUAs can play a role at all in
controlling groundwater mining. Managers
of the modules complain about their lack of
control over private well owners. These
owners are also those who use the canal
network and surface water without paying
for it. Although CNA remains the entity re-
sponsible for controlling the aquifers, mod-
ules could play a more powerful role than
they have done so far in monitoring the ex-
ploitation of groundwater.
Impact on System Maintenance
8Expressing expenses in
dollar terms only masks
the improvements made
by the WUAs under
conditions of the eco-
nomic crisis that fol-
lowed the devaluation




from 56 pesos/ha in the
pre-transfer years to 108
pesos/ha in the post-
transfer years, which is
an increase of 93 per-
cent.20
fore transfer to 65 after transfer, with 19
staff still being employed by CNA and 46
by the modules (table 2). This would sug-
gest that after transfer the same level of
maintenance is achieved with fewer staff.
Another approach is to compare actual
quantities of maintenance work before and
after transfer. Figure 13 shows such a com-
parison for the example of total desiltation
work done by CNA and the modules. The
figure clearly shows the tremendous in-
crease in total volume of desiltation done in
primary and secondary canals and drains
after transfer: 438,581 m
3/year (average of
1982–1992) compared to 1,257,421 m
3/year
(average of 1993–1996). Moreover, the figure
shows that CNA had virtually stopped
desilting the main canals after 1993, al-
though officially it was still under CNA’s
responsibility. Finally, the figure demon-
strates that the modules have been particu-
larly concerned with cleaning the drains,
including the main drains that still fall un-
der CNA’s responsibility. The observations
suggest that not only is there an increase in
volume of work done, but also that mainte-
nance work has shifted proportionately
more towards lower system levels—the sec-
ondary canals and the drains—and away
from main canals.
Neither of the two approaches dis-
cussed above measures the impact of these
observed changes in maintenance on the
ability of the system to transport and con-
trol water (Svendsen 1996). Unfortunately,
accurate and reliable data on the physical
condition of the system before transfer are
not available and hence making a before
and after comparison is not possible.
Interviews with system managers and
farmers reveal how they perceive mainte-
nance work has affected system perfor-
mance. Module field staff and managers
alike report that farmers were very dissatis-
fied with the level of maintenance done by
CNA before transfer, especially at the level
of the drains. They mentioned that there
was a felt obligation to meet their commit-
ment to the users to first clean the drains as
soon as possible after transfer. However,
some CNA staff (while acknowledging the
enormous increase in volume of desiltation
FIGURE 13.
Desiltation of canals and drains by CNA and the modules, the Alto Rio Lerma Irrigation District,
1984–1996.21
done by the modules) felt that most of the
desiltation done (especially in the drains)
has been redundant and has had no impact
on the hydraulic performance of the system.
Some module managers supported this per-
ception but reported that farmers like to see
the canals and drains to be cleaned and had
put pressure on the modules to do so.
These managers justified their high invest-
ment in desiltation by seeing this as a way
to gain credibility among the users and to
show users that they are accountable to the
requests of the users.
Table 4 shows the results of the farmer
survey on farmers’ perceptions about the
change in maintenance as a consequence of
transfer. More than 70 percent of the farm-
ers reported that the condition of irrigation
network has been good after transfer, while
64 percent of the ejidatarios and 47 percent
of the private growers felt that the condition
has improved after transfer. With respect to
the drainage network, 54 percent of the
ejidatarios and 38 percent of the private
growers affirmed that the condition has im-
proved as a result of transfer. Only 11 per-
cent of the farmers reported that there were
no major maintenance problems before
transfer. Fifty-five percent perceived there
were no such problems after transfer. These
percentages show the high level of satisfac-
tion about current maintenance work done
by the WUAs.
Comparison of maintenance levels
among the 11 modules shows the variation
in the way modules deal with system dete-
rioration. Figure 14A shows that modules
desilt their canals approximately once every
3 years (135% in 4 years). Some modules do
it every 2 years while others have cleaned
only 60 percent or less of their network dur-
ing the 4 years after transfer. Similarly, fig-
ure 14B shows the variation in maintenance
levels per module. The figure shows a strik-
ing decline in total maintenance expendi-
tures per hectare from head-end to tail-end
modules. The two exceptions are Cortazar
and Salamanca modules, which make more
use of the two main canals than any of the
other modules. Although not their responsi-
bility, both modules invested heavily in
maintaining these main canals in addition
to their assigned reaches, to guarantee a re-
liable supply to their secondary canals. The
decline in expenditures from head to tail
cannot be explained by different levels of
TABLE 4.
Farmers’ perceptions of the change in maintenance service as a result of IMT.
Ejidatarios (n=90) Private growers (n=35)
Condition of the Condition of the Condition of the Condition of the
irrigation network drainage network irrigation network drainage network
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Poor before and after IMT 7 3 6 0
Poor before, good after IMT 64 54 47 38
Good before and after IMT 11 33 24 41
Good before, poor after IMT 9 1 6 9
Other* 9 9 17 12
Total 100 100 100 100
* “Other” includes ‘don’t know,’ ‘no response,’ and ‘not applicable because respondent only uses a private well.’22
fee collection rates (see figure 16 in the next
section), nor by the fact that these modules
have less of a problem with siltation since
they are further away from the dams. Com-
parison of module data indicates that tail-
end modules are relatively smaller and
have relatively less infrastructure to main-
tain: on average, 40 meters of canal and
drainage network per hectare for the 6
head-end modules versus 30 meters per
hectare for the 5 tail-end modules. Further-
more, data show that some of these mod-
ules spend relatively more on operational
and energy costs as some pump directly
from the Lerma River.
FIGURE 14A.
Percentage of canal network desilted by the modules, the Alto Rio Lerma Irrigation District, 1993–
1996.
FIGURE 14B.
Comparison of maintenance expenditures (July 1994 US$) per hectare by modules, the Alto Rio
Lerma Irrigation District, 1993–1996.23
Prior to transfer, farmers had to go to the
CNA Unit offices to pay their irrigation fees.
Interviews with CNA officials and farmers
indicate that many farmers did not pay their
fees for several reasons. These include: the
long distances that farmers had to travel to
these offices; the long hours farmers had to
wait in line to pay their fees; the extra unof-
ficial transaction costs farmers had to pay to
the fee collectors; the practice of bribing the
ditch tenders directly rather than paying the
official fee; and, the little power to sanction
that CNA had over farmers who did not pay.
After transfer, farmers pay the WUAs di-
rectly. Only 2 percent of the farmers sur-
veyed say that payment is more difficult af-
ter transfer. Forty percent report that the pro-
cess of paying has become much less cum-
bersome after transfer; the most important
reasons mentioned by farmers are:
1. Shorter administrative and physical dis-
tances, because of more offices where
farmers can make their payments.
2. Better financial transparency because of
the use of computers.
3. Better personal service by and reduc-
tion in unauthorized payments made to
the administrative staff that collects the
fees.
Sixty-nine percent of the farmers report
that the practice of bribing the ditch tenders
has been reduced as a result of transfer. The
reason for this is, that in comparison with
the situation prior to transfer, distances be-
tween users and management are much
shorter. A year and a half of participatory
observation in two modules has revealed
that many farmers come to the module of-
fice to complain about rent-seeking atti-
tudes of ditch tenders. This has often re-
sulted in ditch tenders being fired by the
module leaders. The high turnover of ditch
tenders and their frequent rotation over dif-
ferent sections within the module area help
prevent the creation of patron-client rela-
tionships between ditch tenders and users.
However, this does not mean that rent-seek-
ing behavior has ceased to exist; 30 percent
of the farmers report that they still bribe
ditch tenders, for instance to irrigate more
than the entitled area or to get water at dif-
ferent times than programmed.
One major reason why farmers agreed
to take on O&M responsibilities was that
this would give them direct control over the
fees collected from them. The new module
leadership realized that to sustain the sys-
tem, the first challenge was to improve the
fee collection rate and to try to at least
maintain the level of the irrigation fee. Table
5 shows the development of the fee per
hectare that a farmer pays every time the
irrigation service is delivered, before and
after transfer. To prepare farmers to paying
fees that better reflect the actual O&M cost,
2 years before transfer, CNA increased the
charge by approximately 400 percent, which
explains the sudden increase observed in
figure 15. After transfer the modules did
not succeed in keeping up with inflation
rates, which explains the fall from approxi-
mately US$17 per hectare of irrigation ser-
vices in 1993 to about $8 in 1996.
9
Figure 15 shows a similar decline in
fees paid by farmers after correction for in-
flation. The fee dropped in terms of total
cost per hectare per season, and as a per-
centage of gross value of output (GVO). The
figure indicates that the cost of irrigation to
farmers has declined from almost 6 percent
of the GVO in the year of transfer to 2 per-
cent in 1996. Yet, 62 percent of the farmers
report they perceive that the cost of irriga-
tion water has increased after transfer.
Impact on O&M Financing and Financial Management
9In actual peso terms the
fee has remained the
same.24
TABLE 5.
Historical development of the irrigation fee for canal irrigation in the Alto Rio Lerma Irrigation
District.
Year Season Fee Fee Produce in kg/ha of irrigation service
(Nominal pesos/ha of (1994 US$/ha of Sorghum Wheat
irrigation service) irrigation service)
1983 Winter 0.3 6.10 23
Summer 0.7 10.00 54
1984 Winter 0.7 7.69 28
Summer 0.7 6.00 24
1985 Winter 1.0 7.14 27
Summer 1.0 5.39 26
1986 Winter 1.4 5.63 23
Summer 1.4 3.64 19
1987 Winter 3.0 5.39 20
Summer 3.0 2.18 19
1988 Winter 10.0 7.26 30
Summer 10.0 6.60 34
1989 Winter 9.6 5.90 24
Summer 9.6 5.35 28
1990 Winter 42.0 20.64 76
Summer 42.0 18.48 127
1991 Winter 49.6 19.56 76
Summer 49.6 18.14 113
1992 Winter 49.6 16.86 81
Summer 49.6 16.16 127
1993 Winter 55.8 17.22 93
Summer 55.8 16.58 151
1994 Winter 55.8 16.10 93
Summer 55.8 15.62 140
1995 Winter 55.8 11.96 67
Summer 55.8 10.52 60
1996 Winter 55.8 8.77 29
Summer 64.0 7.31 64
Irrespective of the recent erosion of the
per hectare-irrigation fee, for reasons
explained above, the modules succeeded in
dramatically increasing the overall
collection rate. Table 6 shows the develop-
ment of both the self-sufficiency (actual
collection over actual expenditure)
10 and
the fee collection rate (actual collection over
planned collection). Clearly, one of the
major impacts of transfer in ARLID is the
enormous improvement in self-sufficiency:
from about 50 percent in the 3 years
preceding transfer to over 120 percent in
the post-transfer years. Data on planned fee
collection for the pre-transfer period are not
available, but data for the 4 years that
follow transfer show an average collection
rate of 120 percent.
11
10The actual O&M ex-
penditures after 1992 do
not include the cost of
the staff still employed
by CNA as these are all
paid out of federal
funds rather than out of
the fees collected from
farmers.
11The planned fee collec-
tion is based on the
planned acreage irri-
gated and the planned
number of irrigations
for a particular year,
multiplied with the cur-
rent per ha-irrigation
tariff, and hence does
not reflect the required
sum needed to manage
the district optimally.
Under this methodology
any change in the num-
ber of irrigations actu-
ally delivered changes
the collection rate.25
enue from the fee. The figure also shows
the historical decline in fee revenue as a
consequence of the economic crisis that fol-
lowed the December 1994 devaluation of
the peso. Finally, the figure shows that most
modules succeeded in maintaining a fee col-
lection rate above 100 percent.
12
Table 7 shows an example of how two
modules have allocated their financial re-
sources. The first observation is that in both
modules real O&M expenditures have in-
creased, particularly in Cortazar, mainly as
a consequence of high investments in reha-
bilitating the modules´ public deep tube
wells and the increase in energy costs for
operating these wells.
13 From its creation in
1992 onwards, the Salvatierra module has
always had difficulties with balancing its
income and expenditures, resulting in a to-
tal positive balance of only 9 pesos/ha over
4 years. Three reasons explain this fragile
situation:
1. Salvatierra has a large number of farm-
ers with relatively small landholdings,
FIGURE 15.
Seasonal irrigation fee (July 1994 US$) per hectare and as percent-
age of GVO, the Alto Rio Lerma Irrigation District, winter seasons
1982–1996.
FIGURE 16.
Fee revenue (July 1994 US$) and average annual collection rate, the Alto Rio Lerma Irrigation
District, 1992–1996.
12This was possible be-
cause modules often
could provide more irri-
gation sessions over and
above the amount upon
which the planned col-
lection target was based.
13Since the early 1990s,
the Government of
Mexico has been phas-
ing out subsidies on en-
ergy. An evaluation of
the consumption and
operational costs of pri-
vate and public deep
tube wells is given by
Kloezen and Garcés
Restrepo (n.d.[b]).
Figure 16 shows the difference between
modules in revenue mobilized per hectare
from irrigation fees. These revenues range
from US$116 to $205 per hectare for 4 years,
with an average of $182 per hectare (1994
dollars). The Acambaro module, because of
its higher elevation and cooler climate, gets
by with the provision of one less irrigation
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TABLE 7.
Per hectare O&M expenditure and income (real pesos) and distribution of categories, the Salvatierra and Cortazar
modules, 1993–1996.
 Salvatierra Module  Cortazar Module
Expenditures 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total
Total O&M cost (pesos/ha) 221 225 211 250 908 165 250 228 330 973
System maintenance (%) 43 44 35 31 38 17 20 23 19 20
System operation (%) 19 17 23 22 20 11 18 17 13 15
Administration (%) 14 15 17 17 16 16 15 14 14 15
O&M of official wells (%) 12 11 10 16 12 13 14 15 26 18
Depreciation of heavy machinery (%) 0 1 1 3 1 7 6 5 8 7
Fee payment to CNA (%) 12 10 11 11 11 33 24 25 19 24
Others (%) 1 1 4 1 2 3 3 0 1 2
Income
Total income (pesos/ ha) 202 202 269 244 917 247 271 277 287 1,083
Irrigation fees (%) 100 100 72 96 90 97 97 89 93 94
Rent of machinery (%) 0 0 22 0 7 0 0 0 0 0
Bank interest and others (%) 0 0 6 4 3 3 3 11 7 6
Self-sufficiency
Income - Expenditure (pesos/ha) -19 -23 58 -6 9 82 21 49 -43 110
Note: US$1.00 (July 1994) = Pesos 3.5.
TABLE 6.
Change in self-sufficiency and fee collection rate, the Alto Rio Lerma Irrigation Department, 1989-1996 (in nominal
pesos and constant July 1994 US dollars).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Actual O&M expenditure Planned fee collection Actual fee collection Self- Fee collection
sufficiency rate
Pesos Pesos/ha July 1994 Pesos Pesos/ha July 1994 Pesos Pesos/ha July 1994 % (7/1) % (7/4)
 US$/ha  US$/ha  US$/ha
1989 6,633,603 79 44 na na na 3,305,590 39 22 50 na
1990 8,433,104 100 44 na na na 3,545,013 42 19 42 na
1991 12,664,518 151 55 na na na 7,440,000 88 32 59 na
1992 14,107,094 168 55 na na na na na na na na
1993 12,514,641 149 44 13,018,285 155 46 16,086,021 191 57 129 124
1994 14,669,207 174 49 16,066,900 191 53 18,280,700 217 61 125 114
1995 15,758,926 187 35 13,958,243 166 31 17,164,590 204 38 109 123
1996 15,596,666 185 26 16,300,483 194 28 19,876,120 236 34 127 122
Note: na = Data not available.27
making it necessary to employ a larger
number of ditch tenders (as shown in
table 1).
2. Much of the module’s infrastructure is
in disrepair, resulting in higher mainte-
nance cost.
3. The module is known for its internal
political problems, resulting in "favorit-
ism" in the module's staff employment
policy and relatively high salary costs
for management staff.
Particularly in its first year of operation,
Cortazar succeeded in keeping its costs low
while achieving high revenue from fee col-
lection. As a consequence, the module im-
mediately bought its own heavy machinery.
The module succeeded in maintaining this
situation till 1996, when expenditures
started exceeding the module´s income.
These two examples show that, over the
first 4 years of their operation, the modules
could maintain financial self-sufficiency, but
in 1996 even a business-oriented module
like Cortazar started to have difficulties
maintaining its financial viability.
All modules acknowledge that this
situation could jeopardize their financial
sustainability. By the end of 1996, all
modules started to rethink the situation,
which resulted in two strategies. First, the
modules used the hydraulic committee to
negotiate an increase of the fee to US$11 per
hectare of irrigation services for the 1996–97
winter season. Even so, interviews with
managers of several modules and CNA staff
reveal that this amount is less than half of
what they feel they should collect to man-
age the modules at optimum level. Second,
modules have pushed CNA to transfer
O&M responsibilities for the main system to
them. This resulted in the establishment of
the LRS in February 1997 and a reduction in
the average percentage of the fee paid to
CNA, from 25 percent to 9.5 percent of the
total fees collected.
As demonstrated in table 7, a major
weakness in the financial management
systems of the 11 WUAs in ARLID is that
the associations rely almost entirely on
irrigation fees for their revenue. Moreover,
fee revenue is totally dependent on the
availability of water, as farmers are charged
per number of irrigation services provided.
This means that in dry years WUAs will
not have sufficient income to maintain their
regular staff or even keep their offices open.
None of the 11 WUAs in ARLID maintain a
contingency fund that could help them to
overcome any kind of financial shortfall or
to have a financial reserve for emergency
repairs. When asked why such a fund was
not kept, leaders of WUAs mentioned two
reasons. First, annual inflation rates of more
than 50 percent are not an incentive to save
money. Second, building a contingency
fund is only possible by charging a flat fee
on top of the fee per number of irrigation
services provided. The current agreement
between the WUAs and CNA says that the
WUAs have to pay CNA a fixed percentage
over all the fees they collect, including any
extra fee. For this reason, WUAs are reluc-
tant to charge a fee other than the per
hectare of irrigation services fee.
14The “standardized”
value refers to the pro-
cess of converting all
crop yields to an
“equivalent” yield of a
base crop as a function
of farm gate prices and
areas (percentages)
grown.28
Figure 17 shows the trend in yields for
the major winter crops at ARLID. Data are
analyzed in terms of “wheat equivalents,”
which allow standardized comparison of
productivity over time. This facilitates com-
parison between different modules, irriga-
tion districts, and irrigation sources
(Kloezen and, Garcés-Restrepo n.d.[b]). In
this case, the base crop is wheat. The figure
shows an upward trend for wheat and bar-
ley yields which started in about 1988 and
continues to date. Since transfer in ARLID
did not take place until the end of 1992, the
improvement cannot be attributed to the
transfer process. On the other hand, it can
also be argued that the IMT has not re-
sulted in yield declines for these crops,
which is—given the increase in the cost of
agricultural inputs—a positive outcome.
The agricultural productivity per unit
of water supplied for both surface irrigation
and wells at ARLID is shown in figure 18.
Comparison of the two seasons suggests
that productivity per unit of water supplied
is lower in winter than in summer but has
less variation since more irrigation water is
supplied in winter. With respect to the post-
transfer period, no definite trend can be ob-
served for the winter productivity values.
The upward trend for both summer and
winter after 1995 can be attributed to higher
commodity prices in those years. For in-
stance, world wheat prices increased from
US$150 per metric ton in 1991 to $262 per
metric ton in July 1996. Mexican farm gate
prices for wheat, sorghum, and maize fol-
lowed a similar upward trend.
Similarly, the agricultural productivity
values related to groundwater use during
winter do not show much variation while
summer presents a definite upper trend
owing to the same reasons explained for ca-
nal water. The water productivity values for
FIGURE 18.
Standardized gross value (July 1994 US$) of output per unit of water


































Average yields for major crops, the Alto Rio Lerma Irrigation District,
winter seasons 1982–1996.




















































To assess the impact of the IMT program on
the agricultural and economic productivity
of ARLID, change in crop yields (tons/ha),
standardized gross value of output per unit
of water supplied, and standardized gross
value of output per irrigated cropped area
14
are used (Molden, Sakthi-vadivel, and
Perry, forthcoming).29
FIGURE 19.
Standardized gross value (July 1994 US$) of outputs per hectare
cropped, for wheat and sorghum, surface irrigation, and wells, the


























ARLID, ranging from US$0.05/m
3 to $0.35/
m
3 as shown are on the higher end of the
range found for systems around the world
(Molden, Sakthivadivel, and Perry, forth-
coming).
The standardized gross values of
output per unit of land for both cropping
seasons and the two water sources are
presented in figure 19. The values fluctuate
between US$1,000/ha and $2,000/ha for
surface irrigated fields and between $1,000/
ha and $3,300/ha for the wells that
normally irrigate higher-value crops. For
the same reasons as explained above, the
graph does not show a particular trend that
can be attributed to the transfer program.
To summarize, productivity values of
both land and water are high at ARLID
compared to other systems studied by IIMI
(Molden, Sakthivadivel, and Perry, forth-
coming). Fluctuations in these values,
however, cannot be related directly to the
transfer program but have to be viewed in
the context of other economic changes that
have occurred as a result of the agricultural
price policies followed since the 1980s.
Conclusions
The Mexican IMT program is known and
advocated as one of the most ambitious and
successful of its kind worldwide, not only
because of the large scale of its irrigated
area and the speed of its implementation,
but also because of the positive impacts
claimed to be the result of the strategy fol-
lowed (see e.g., Ujjankop 1995). However,
hardly any information has been provided
on the characteristics of the program and no
convincing evidence has been published to
support the claim that the Mexican IMT
model leads to positive results, in Mexico or
worldwide. This study has aimed to fill part
of the gap in information and evidence and
to test the hypotheses given above.
IMT in ARLID has been a rapid top-
down process that met with relatively little
resistance from farmers. This rapid process
was made possible because, amongst oth-
ers, the following conditions were clearly
met. Some of these characteristics can be
found in some Asian and Latin American
IMT programs, as well as in the more re-
cent IMT example of Turkey (see Vermillion
1997 and Svendsen, Trava, and Johnson
1997 for overviews).
1. The IMT program did not come on its
own but followed and is part of a
much wider set of agricultural and po-
litical liberalization policies.
2. IMT was accompanied by a new law
that not only supported the transfer of
authority and responsibilities to the us-30
ers but provided them concessions to
use the infrastructure and machinery.
3. A high political commitment to make
public agency staff redundant as
needed.
4. WUAs were not forced to hire ex-
agency staff.
5. Leaders and staff of newly established
WUAs were given professional train-
ing.
6. WUAs agreed to jointly manage the
system with the agency during a fixed
and relatively short period of time.
7. The Mexican IMT program aims not to
maximize direct user participation in
O&M, but to involve farmers in repre-
sentative governance.
It is important to understand that this
specific set of conditions could be met in
Mexico only because of the distinctive orga-
nization of Mexican irrigated agriculture.
Hence, not all of them could be readily
adopted in settings which have different
agrarian structures. For instance, the politi-
cal commitment to devolving authority to
users and to downsize a public agency
should be understood in the context of the
neoliberal developments that started in the
early 1980s and the political wish to reform
the ejido sector. Likewise, the speed of
implementing the IMT program can partly
be explained by the existence of a strong
social and institutional network: the ejidos
and the several institutions that organize
private growers.
The case from ARLID shows the
importance of allowing diverse ways in
which IMT can be implemented among the
modules within one single district, as well
as the heterogeneity in which WUAs may
adapt the program to suit their needs, the
flexibility of the government in allowing the
users to modify their organizations, and the
O&M strategies they follow. These dif-
ferences normally follow historical differ-
ences in farmers´ experiences with forms of
collective action and building social capital
from below (Fox 1995 and 1996), and of
relationships between different groups of
users (ejidatarios v. private growers), as well
as between the users and the irrigation
agency.
The following are the main impacts of
the IMT program at ARLID.
1. Farmers’ increased control has not led
to major improvements in operational
performance. Although the hydraulic
committee has become an important in-
stitution in which users participate in
planning the use of and control over
the water source, there is no evidence
that transfer has resulted in significant
improvements in the way water is allo-
cated and distributed. With the excep-
tion of some modules like Cortazar,
generally modules have so far followed
the same allocation and distribution
principles and practices as used by
CNA. As a result, RWS values at all
levels continue to be high. Similarly, no
changes in the area irrigated or crop-
ping patterns can be attributed to trans-
fer.
2. Farmers’ increased involvement in deci-
sion making and control has increased
managerial accountability. Even so, the
farmer survey shows the majority of
farmers perceiving that the quality of
system operations has either remained
the same or has improved. Farmers are
particularly positive about the improve-
ment of services provided by the ditch
tenders as they feel that, compared to the
pre-transfer period under CNA, WUAs
have more control over the ditch tenders’
work and rent-seeking behavior.31
3. As the transfer program mainly aimed
at improving the use of surface irriga-
tion, it was not expected that major
changes in groundwater use would oc-
cur as a result of transfer. Yet, it is ap-
parent that the alarming level of over-
exploitation of aquifers by well owners
in ARLID is not being reduced. Al-
though CNA will continue to be the au-
thorizing institution that controls the
aquifers, transfer has resulted in a con-
siderable reduction in the role and
mandate of CNA in the State of
Guanajuato. As a consequence, it will
become more and more difficult for
CNA to adequately monitor aquifers.
WUAs do not seem to have the interest,
nor the legal power to assume that role.
4. IMT has led to a better match between
actual expenditures and farmers´ per-
ceived needs, especially in the field of
maintenance. One of the most positive
impacts of the IMT program in ARLID
has been the considerable improvement
in maintenance services, especially at
lower system levels. Other improve-
ments include: the purchase of modern
machinery by the modules; a moderate
increase in the proportion of the total
O&M budget spent on maintenance;
and maintaining the level of mainte-
nance expenditures per hectare in con-
stant dollar terms, or doubling this
level in real peso terms. These improve-
ments are clearly acknowledged by the
farmers surveyed. Soon after transfer in
1992, CNA stopped cleaning the main
canals as well, which caused much con-
cern among the WUAs and eventually
led to the WUAs taking over responsi-
bility for managing the main system as
well as the distributary subsystem. As a
result, payment of the modules to CNA
has been reduced from 25 percent to 9.5
percent of the total fee collection. While
it is apparent that the amount of main-
tenance work has increased since trans-
fer and has helped the modules to in-
crease their credibility, it is not clear
what this has meant for the physical
capability of the system to transport
water to farms.
5. Another apparent improvement that re-
sulted from the transfer program is the
increase in financial self-sufficiency
from around 50 percent in the years
preceding transfer to around 120 per-
cent in the post-transfer years. This is
mainly due to the ability of the WUAs
to achieve fee collection rates of over
100 percent. Moreover, all modules at
ARLID hired highly professional ad-
ministrative staff and use good com-
puter software to handle daily financial
administration. This has resulted in im-
proving the financial transparency of
the WUAs.
A post-transfer period of 4 years is
not enough to assess whether these
rates are enough to guarantee long-
term sustainability of the system. Al-
though the actual O&M expenditures
per hectare have almost doubled in
terms of real pesos, the devaluation of
the peso in 1994 and the high inflation
rates that followed this devaluation ex-
plain why O&M expenditures have
dropped by almost half in constant dol-
lar terms.
6. IMT has not resulted in an increase in
the cost of water to farmers. Although
the cost of irrigation to farmers remains
low after transfer (less than 5% of the
GVO), WUAs find it very difficult to
convince farmers that irrigation fees
should be increased to keep up with in-
flation. Furthermore, none of the mod-32
ules created a contingency fund for fu-
ture emergencies or basic repairs.
7. The study does not provide convincing
evidence that there has been any effect
of the transfer program on agricultural
and economic productivity. Although
fluctuations can be observed, even after
transfer, it is believed that these are re-
lated to other recent developments in
the agriculture sector such as the dis-
mantling of credit and subsidy systems,
input price policies, and, most of all,
price changes in the world commodity
markets.
Finally, although 4 years of experience
with IMT in ARLID shows positive results,
the main impacts summarized above sug-
gest that WUAs are facing several problems
listed below, which are common among
many newly created WUAs worldwide (Fox
1995 and 1996).
1. Although, the IMT program was ac-
companied by a new National Water
Act, this act does not sufficiently pro-
vide water rights to individual users,
nor does it provide mechanisms that
allow prioritizing among different types
of uses in times of water scarcity.
2. None of the WUAs have established ef-
fective mechanisms to cope with high
annual inflation rates and potential fi-
nancial shortfalls. This could jeopardize
the sustainability of WUAs.
3. Although good training was provided
to most WUAs at the time of transfer,
the high turnover of staff calls for con-
tinuous staff training. With the agency´s
role in irrigation management being re-
duced, it becomes more and more diffi-
cult for WUAs to obtain good training.
4. Downsizing the number of staff of the
agency does not mean that the role of
the agency ceases to exist, but it is ob-
served that it is difficult to identify new
roles that the agency could take on (es-
pecially in training and monitoring)
and to start upgrading the agency´s ca-
pacity to provide technical support to
the WUAs.
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